The Bodo & Ulfa Problem

Bhutan Bodo & Ulfa Conflict Bhutanese border patrol attacks Indian rebels January 2003 National Assembly debates course of action on the militant problem July 2002 The Dzongkhag Chimi's concern

Bhutanese security forces have attacked anti-India rebels based in Bhutan for the first time. Four rebels from the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) died in a gun battle, after being intercepted by a patrol in the Manas reserve forest straddling Bhutan's border in Assam. The Bhutanese troops suffered no casualties.

The NDFB and the other Assamese rebel group, the United Liberation Front of Assam or (ULFA) have maintained bases in southern Bhutan for more than a decade. Bhutan has been under severe Indian pressure to push these rebels out of its territory. But the Bhutanese government has said it will try persuasion first and use force only when it fails. The rebels however promised to move out of Bhutan by the end of December, but have apparently not done so.

Impassioned debate rose to a peak as the elected members of the National Assembly of Bhutan expressed their frustration over the militant problem in the south which not only seemed to drag on but was now becoming more protracted and difficult. Some members saw partial success in the closing of four ULFA camps last December and some did not believe that the ULFA had reduced their strength. But most members believed that the problem was being compounded, with the infiltration of the KLO, and that there was an urgent need for an early and lasting solution.

The home minister, Lyonpo Thinley Gyamtsho, reminded the Assembly of the four-point resolution: peaceful solution through talks; stopping of supplies and rations; prosecution of those assisting the militants; and military action. He informed the Assembly that he had held six rounds of talks, four with ULFA leaders and two with Bodo leaders, since 1998. Since the 79th session of the National Assembly, he had held one round of talks with Mr. Arabinda Rajkhowa, Chairman of the ULFA. Mr. Rajkhowa had reiterated that the ULFA understood the problems faced by Bhutan as a result of their presence and reassured the government that the ULFA would completely withdraw from Bhutan. Lyonpo Thinley Gyamtsho informed the Assembly that, as of December 31, 2001, the ULFA had indeed closed down the four camps as per the agreed minutes. The camps closed were Gobarkonda, Nangri, Deori and the Military Training Centre in Martshala geog. The camp sites had been subsequently visited by Bhutanese military and civil authorities and all the camps were burnt down to ensure that they could not be used again. "The closure of the four ULFA camps as per the agreed minutes of June, 2001, without firing a single shot and without the loss of a single life, is a small step towards a peaceful solution of the presence of these armed foreign militants in our territory," the home minister said.

Although only five camps should be left, the ULFA had opened a new camp on a mountain ridge above the Samdrup Jongkhar-Trashigang highway, said the home minister. Thus the ULFA today had six camps within Bhutan. The home minister said that it was difficult to confirm that militants from the camps that had closed down had left Bhutan. He said the ULFA leaders themselves had said that most of the men and materials could not be taken out of Bhutan in time because the Indian Army had sealed the Indo Bhutan border.
There is also every possibility that the ULFA may not have complied with the second clause of the agreed minutes, to reduce the strength of their cadres in their remaining five camps, as it is not feasible for the royal government to monitor the movements of ULFA militants across the Bhutan-Assam border," he added.
Meanwhile the NDFB had three main camps and four mobile camps between Lhamoizingkha and Daifam. Lyonpo Thinley Gyamtsho informed the Assembly that it was recently confirmed that a third armed Indian militant outfit, the Kamtapur Liberation organisation (KLO), had established camps on Bhutanese territory. While the ULFA and Bodos were from the state of Assam, the KLO were Rajbansi tribals of North Bengal, bordering Chhukha and Samtse dzongkhags. The KLO wanted to carve out a separate state for the Kamtapuris in these districts.
Although the royal government has been for some time aware of the close links between the ULFA and KLO, it came to know of the existence of KLO camps within Bhutanese territory only recently," the home minister said. #The KLO has two camps, one under Bhangtar dungkhag and another near Piping under Lhamoizingkha dungkhag."

Lyonpo Thinley Gyamtsho said that the presence of armed foreign militants continued to pose a grave threat to Bhutan's national security and sovereignty. Although the ULFA had reduced the number of camps, their strength in Bhutan in terms of men and material is difficult to confirm, he added. Besides, after two rounds of meetings in October 2000, and May, 2001, including with its president D. R. Nabla, no more talks could be held with the NDFB. The discovery of the third militant outfit, the KLO from the state of West Bengal, made the whole issue of the presence of armed foreign militants in Bhutan even more complicated and difficult.

Lyonpo Thinley Gyamtsho said that there had been a drastic reduction in the transportation of supplies and rations along motor roads, highways, and other known routes. But, along the long and porous border between Bhutan and Assam, there were countless footpaths through which local Assamese and the militants were transporting supplies and rations to the camps inside Bhutan. Even though it created great hardship and inconvenience to the Bhutanese people and businessmen, all the shops in Nganglam, Bhangtar and Lhamoizingkha areas had been closed.

Because of the infiltration by the KLO, shops between Tashilakha and Piping had also been closed. Some shops in Dagapela were also closed. "Our shopkeepers who are dependent on their shops for livelihood suffer losses and great hardship when their shops are closed. Similarly, our people who are dependent on the shops for food and other consumer goods are also facing great difficulties," he said. People found selling supplies to the militants were tried in court under the national security act. Realizing the grave threat to Bhutan's security and sovereignty, the council of ministers had held extensive deliberations on the problem. In February and March this year, the council of ministers had met several times to formulate strategies to remove the militants from Bhutan. To give peaceful initiative a final chance, the council of ministers had recommended that Bhutan should hold a last meeting with the highest ULFA leaders. If this meeting produced no positive and concrete result, the council of ministers decided that the only option left was military action. "It is now up to the National Assembly to consider the decision taken by the council of ministers and to provide direction for the country to follow," said Lyonpo Thinley Gyamtsho.

The Punakha chimi agreed that the arrival of the new militant group cast doubt and suspicion in the minds of the people. "Such a situation reminds us of the fate of Sikkim," he said. "If this trend continues, we should now turn our attentions towards the north." Meanwhile, he suggested, the government should negotiate with all the three militant groups and also hold talks with the state governments of Assam and West Bengal. He said that the people had doubts in their minds because the militants were able to slip through the large and powerful resources which India had at its disposal. Although the relationship between India and Bhutan was like that of two brothers, it must be kept in mind that even brothers had problems.

To hold talks with the chairman and the military commander of ULFA together because, in the past, it was on the pretext of the absence of one or the other that no decisions could be taken during the meetings. It was decided that both the chairman and the commander should be present for any further meetings.

The government would not agree to any more meetings on the reduction of camps but would only discuss the closure of the main camp which served as their headquarter.

The headquarter of the ULFA, used by their leaders and military commanders, must be moved out of Bhutan. The other ULFA camps would close and the militants would leave the country if their headquarter was moved.

"There is no use if they agree to move two or three camps because we will never know if they will be merged into the other remaining camps or be relocated in another area within our country," His Majesty said. "It is not possible to count or determine the number of militants in the dense forests where it is difficult to even locate them." If the leaders of the ULFA refused to relocate their headquarter, then it will be clear to the government and people of Bhutan that the ULFA has no intention of leaving Bhutanese territory and therefore there would be no other option but to evict them physically. His Majesty said that these decisions had been taken, keeping in mind the importance of ensuring the peace and security of the country and the well being of the Bhutanese people. If this strategy worked, it would greatly benefit the country. His Majesty advised that it would be important for the National Assembly to discuss the decision of the Lhengye Zhungtsho and adopt a clear resolution on the problem.

His Majesty explained that the KLO was a new group from West Bengal and, at this stage, the government did not even know who their leaders were. However, the ULFA were the most important among the three militant groups.