Bhutanese
security forces have attacked anti-India rebels based in Bhutan for the
first time. Four rebels from the National Democratic Front of Bodoland
(NDFB) died in a gun battle, after being intercepted by a patrol in the
Manas reserve forest straddling Bhutan's border in Assam. The Bhutanese
troops suffered no casualties.
The NDFB and the other Assamese rebel group, the United Liberation Front of Assam or (ULFA) have maintained bases in southern Bhutan for more than a decade. Bhutan has been under severe Indian pressure to push these rebels out of its territory. But the Bhutanese government has said it will try persuasion first and use force only when it fails. The rebels however promised to move out of Bhutan by the end of December, but have apparently not done so.
Impassioned debate rose to a peak as the elected members of the National Assembly of Bhutan expressed their frustration over the militant problem in the south which not only seemed to drag on but was now becoming more protracted and difficult. Some members saw partial success in the closing of four ULFA camps last December and some did not believe that the ULFA had reduced their strength. But most members believed that the problem was being compounded, with the infiltration of the KLO, and that there was an urgent need for an early and lasting solution.
The
home minister, Lyonpo Thinley Gyamtsho, reminded the Assembly of the four-point
resolution: peaceful solution through talks; stopping of supplies and rations;
prosecution of those assisting the militants; and military action. He informed
the Assembly that he had held six rounds of talks, four with ULFA leaders
and two with Bodo leaders, since 1998. Since the 79th session of the National
Assembly, he had held one round of talks with Mr. Arabinda Rajkhowa, Chairman
of the ULFA. Mr. Rajkhowa had reiterated that the ULFA understood the problems
faced by Bhutan as a result of their presence and reassured the government
that the ULFA would completely withdraw from Bhutan. Lyonpo Thinley Gyamtsho
informed the Assembly that, as of December 31, 2001, the ULFA had indeed
closed down the four camps as per the agreed minutes. The camps closed
were Gobarkonda, Nangri, Deori and the Military Training Centre in Martshala
geog. The camp sites had been subsequently visited by Bhutanese military
and civil authorities and all the camps were burnt down to ensure that
they could not be used again. "The closure of the four ULFA camps as per
the agreed minutes of June, 2001, without firing a single shot and without
the loss of a single life, is a small step towards a peaceful solution
of the presence of these armed foreign militants in our territory," the
home minister said.
Although
only five camps should be left, the ULFA had opened a new camp on a mountain
ridge above the Samdrup Jongkhar-Trashigang highway, said the home minister.
Thus the ULFA today had six camps within Bhutan. The home minister
said that it was difficult to confirm that militants from the camps that
had closed down had left Bhutan. He said the ULFA leaders themselves had
said that most of the men and materials could not be taken out of Bhutan
in time because the Indian Army had sealed the Indo Bhutan border.
Lyonpo
Thinley Gyamtsho said that the presence of armed foreign militants continued
to pose a grave threat to Bhutan's national security and sovereignty. Although
the ULFA had reduced the number of camps, their strength in Bhutan in terms
of men and material is difficult to confirm, he added. Besides, after two
rounds of meetings in October 2000, and May, 2001, including with its president
D. R. Nabla, no more talks could be held with the NDFB. The discovery of
the third militant outfit, the KLO from the state of West Bengal, made
the whole issue of the presence of armed foreign militants in Bhutan even
more complicated and difficult.
Lyonpo
Thinley Gyamtsho said that there had been a drastic reduction in the transportation
of supplies and rations along motor roads, highways, and other known routes.
But, along the long and porous border between Bhutan and Assam, there were
countless footpaths through which local Assamese and the militants were
transporting supplies and rations to the camps inside Bhutan. Even though
it created great hardship and inconvenience to the Bhutanese people and
businessmen, all the shops in Nganglam, Bhangtar and Lhamoizingkha areas
had been closed.
Because
of the infiltration by the KLO, shops between Tashilakha and Piping had
also been closed. Some shops in Dagapela were also closed. "Our shopkeepers
who are dependent on their shops for livelihood suffer losses and great
hardship when their shops are closed. Similarly, our people who are dependent
on the shops for food and other consumer goods are also facing great difficulties,"
he said. People found selling supplies to the militants were tried in court
under the national security act. Realizing the grave threat to Bhutan's
security and sovereignty, the council of ministers had held extensive deliberations
on the problem. In February and March this year, the council of ministers
had met several times to formulate strategies to remove the militants from
Bhutan. To give peaceful initiative a final chance, the council of
ministers had recommended that Bhutan should hold a last meeting with the
highest ULFA leaders. If this meeting produced no positive and concrete
result, the council of ministers decided that the only option left was
military action. "It is now up to the National Assembly to consider the
decision taken by the council of ministers and to provide direction for
the country to follow," said Lyonpo Thinley Gyamtsho.
The Punakha chimi agreed that the arrival of the new militant group cast doubt and
suspicion in the minds of the people. "Such a situation reminds us of the
fate of Sikkim," he said. "If this trend continues, we should now turn
our attentions towards the north." Meanwhile, he suggested, the government
should negotiate with all the three militant groups and also hold talks
with the state governments of Assam and West Bengal. He said that
the people had doubts in their minds because the militants were able to
slip through the large and powerful resources which India had at its disposal.
Although the relationship between India and Bhutan was like that of two
brothers, it must be kept in mind that even brothers had problems.
To hold talks with the chairman and the military commander of ULFA together because, in the past, it was on the pretext of the absence of one or the other that no decisions could be taken during the meetings. It was decided that both the chairman and the commander should be present for any further meetings. The government would not agree to any more meetings on the reduction of camps but would only discuss the closure of the main camp which served as their headquarter. The headquarter of the ULFA, used by their leaders and military commanders, must be moved out of Bhutan. The other ULFA camps would close and the militants would leave the country if their headquarter was moved. "There
is no use if they agree to move two or three camps because we will
never know if they will be merged into the other remaining camps or be
relocated in another area within our country," His Majesty said.
"It is not possible to count or determine the number of militants
in the dense forests where it is difficult to even locate them."
If the leaders of the ULFA refused to relocate their headquarter, then
it will be clear to the government and people of Bhutan that the ULFA has
no intention of leaving Bhutanese territory and therefore there would be
no other option but to evict them physically. His Majesty said that these
decisions had been taken, keeping in mind the importance of ensuring
the peace and security of the country and the well being of the Bhutanese
people. If this strategy worked, it would greatly benefit the country.
His Majesty advised that it would be important for the National Assembly
to discuss the decision of the Lhengye Zhungtsho and adopt a clear
resolution on the problem.
His Majesty explained that the KLO was a new group from West Bengal and, at this stage, the government did not even know who their leaders were. However, the ULFA were the most important among the three militant groups. |